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MATERIAL PERSONS, IMMATERIAL SOULS
AND AN ETHIC OF LIFE
Kevin Corcoran

Among objections to naturalist views of human persons like Animalism
and the Constitution View are two that concern alleged ethical implications.
One criticism is that such views are defective because they lack the metaphysical resources to generate moral obligations or moral expectations to
protect life, in either its early or late stages. Another objection relies on the
claim that any metaphysical view of human persons according to which
some human organisms lack the property of personhood has horrendous
moral implications. With respect to the first objection I argue that resources
metaphysically neutral with respect to dualism and naturalism about persons must be added to such views in order to generate moral obligations or
moral expectations to protect human life. In other words, dualism about
persons, no less than naturalism, fails to provide metaphysical resources
necessary or sufficient for generating moral obligations or moral expectations to protect the life of a human fetus or PVS patient. And against the
second objection I argue that accounts of human persons entailing that
some human organisms are not also persons do not have the horrible ethical implications they are alleged to have. I then consider and respond to
several possible objections to my arguments.

According to the Constitution View of human persons, human persons are
essentially physical and essentially psychological,1 One implication of the
Constitution View (CV) is that no early term fetus constitutes a person.
Another implication is that any entity once possessing but having lost all
capacity for the relevant kinds of psychological states, also fails to constitute a person; and, therefore, some human organisms in so-called "persistent vegetative states" (PVS) no longer constitute persons. According to
animalism, on the other hand, human persons are essentially animals, and
only contingently persons. In fact, according to animalism, you and I were
once human, non-persons as fetuses and, if things should go badly for us,
we may one day be human, non-persons again, e.g., if we should ever be
PVS patients with completely destroyed cerebra. 2
Among the objections to naturalist views 3 of human persons like animalism and the Constitution View are two that concern alleged ethical
implications. The two objections I have in mind, however, are seldom distinguished. One is that such views are defective because they lack the
metaphysical resources to generate moral obligations or moral expectaFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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tions to protect life, in either its early or late stages. In other words, there is
a positive moral implication we want a metaphysical view of persons to
have and views like animalism and the CV lack it. Another objection relies
on the claim that our metaphysical view of human persons is decisive for
"virtually every debated issue in biomedical ethics today"4 and that any
view according to which some human organisms lack the property of personhood has horrendous moral implications. Put another way, the positive
moral implications animalism and the CV do have are horrible. In this
paper I acknowledge that naturalist views of human persons like animalism and CV fail to provide metaphysical resources necessary or sufficient
for generating moral obligations or moral expectations to protect the life of
a human fetus or PVS patient. I point out, however, that any metaphysical
view of persons, be that metaphysic dualist or naturalist in nature, is impotent to provide such resources. I argue that other resources, metaphysically neutral with respect to dualism and naturalism, must be added to such
views in order to generate moral obligations or moral expectations to protect human life. Moreover, I think it can be shown that accounts of human
persons entailing that some human organisms are not also persons do not
have the horrible ethical implications they are alleged to have. I will argue
then for the following three claims: (i) neither metaphysical dualism nor
metaphysical naturalism about persons all by itself entails or precludes an
ethic of life; (ii) metaphysical views of human persons entailing that some
human organisms are not also persons are perfectly compatible with the
belief that abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, etc. are morally wrong;
and finally (iii) dualism is compatible with, and on some versions even
entails, the claim that abortion never ends the existence of a human person.
I. The Charge Against Naturalists

The most recent and explicit statement of the objection that one's metaphysics of persons is decisive for the ethical issues of, inter alia, abortion
and euthanasia, appears in J.P. Moreland's and Scott Rae's Body and Soul.
Moreland and Rae argue not only for "the relevance of our philosophical
reflections on human personhood to many of the most intensely debated
moral issues of the day,"S but they also want to "point out the ethical
implications of our philosophical view of a human person."6 Moreland
and Rae hold that "metaphysics and morality are intimately connected".7
They want to argue that the philosophical naturalist account of persons,
and what they call the "Christian Complementarian" account of persons,
have "serious, troublesome implications for the ethical issues [of abortion,
fetal research, cloning and physician assisted suicide]".' They seem to
believe that only a substance dualist view of human persons can deliver
the needed resources for a viable ethic of life. Any view of human persons
according to which some human organisms are not also persons "opens
the door" to the mistreatment of those at the edges of life, both fetuses and
patients in persistent vegetative states. 9
The argument for this claim is supposed to be delivered in chapter 3 of
Body and Soul. The argument appears to be as follows:
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1.

According to naturalist conceptions of persons, human personhood is grounded in the possession of certain kinds of psychological properties or the capacity for them.

2.

If human personhood is grounded in possession of psychologi-

cal properties or capacities for them, then some human organisms fail to instantiate the property of being a person.
3.

If some human organism fails to instantiate the property of
being a person, then that organism lacks a moral status sufficient for generating moral obligations or moral expectations to
protect its life.

:.4. On Naturalist conceptions of persons some human organisms
(e.g. early term human fetuses) fail to instantiate the property of
being a person.

:.5. On Naturalist conceptions of persons some human organisms
lack a moral status sufficient for generating moral obligations or
moral expectations to protect their lives.
It is, I believe, on the basis of such a conclusion as (5) that one might be
erroneously led to conclude that naturalist conceptions of persons have the
following troublesome implication, call it

6.

We have no moral obligations or responsibilities with respect to
non-person constituting human organisms.

The argument to 5 is obviously valid. Although questions can be raised
about other premises, I want to focus in this paper on premise 3. What
Moreland and Rae must do is give good reasons for accepting 3. They
don't. They fail to establish a connection between a so-called naturalist conception of persons and the morality of abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, fetal research and human cloning. What they do in chapter 3 of Body
and Soul is first assert that such a connection exists, go on to describe the
metaphysics of naturalism as it relates to persons, and then reassert the
connection at the end of the chapter. But nowhere in the chapter or elsewhere in the book is the alleged connection established.lO
For Moreland and Rae it is a commitment to metaphysical dualism that
drives the view that a metaphysiCS of persons is decisive for the ethical
issues under discussion. Indeed I think we can capture the intuition at the
root of Moreland's and Rae's argument in terms of a necessary condition
for grounding our obligations to the unborn and other vulnerable human
lives. Call it N.
N:

A necessary condition for grounding our obligations to the
unborn and other vulnerable human lives is a commitment to
persons as immaterial, substantial souls.ll
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Supplementing N with
S:

Naturalist conceptions of personhood assume the denial of
immaterial, substantial souls.

delivers what admittedly would be, if true, a defect in naturalist conceptions of persons, namely,
0:

Naturalist conceptions of personhood are incompatible with
our having obligations to the unborn and other vulnerable
human lives.

The idea that N attempts to capture is, I think, that there is a very tight connection between personhood and moral status such that anything lacking
personhood lacks a moral status sufficient to guarantee a prohibition against
its killing. Given that intuition, and accepting N and S, seems to commit naturalists to the view that we have no moral obligations or responsibilities with
respect to protecting the life of non-person constituting human organisms.
The problem, however, is that although the move to 0 from N and S is
valid N is neither intuitively known nor self-evidently true. Not only is it
not obviously true, it is, I believe, demonstrably false. Indeed I want to
show that not only is dualism not necessary for generating obligations and
responsibilities to fetuses and PVS patients, it is, in fact, compatible with
the belief that no abortion ends the existence of a human person.
II. Metaphysical Insufficiency

If I am correct, then there is at the root of Moreland's and Rae's argument the intuition that a necessary condition for grounding our obligations
to the unborn and other vulnerable human lives is the fact that persons are
immaterial, substantial souls. If that inhlition is true, then the following
couplet of claims would be in some important sense incompatible:

(i) Human persons are necessarily, wholly material things
(ii) Abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, etc. are morally wrong
It seems prima facie obvious, however, that naturalists can be committed to

the moral irnpermissiblity of abortion. This "seeming" does not itself establish the compatibility of the couplet of claims above, but it does I think suggest that metaphysical dualism about persons is not essential for generating a
moral obligation or moral expectation to protect human life. For ease of discussion I will simply refer to the moral obligation or moral expectation to
protect human life as constituting an ethic of life. So to see how a metaphysics
of naturalism is compatible with an ethic of life consider the following.
Suppose human persons are human organisms with developed capacities for the rich sort of psychological life normally associated with paradigm
instances of adult human beings; i.e., suppose human persons are necessarily
psychological beings. If so, then no early term human fetus is a person.
Surely, however, one with such a view of human persons as just described
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could quite coherently protest the abortion of an early term fetus on the
grounds that a) it is prima facie morally wrong to destroy a person in potentia
and a normal human fetus is just such a being or b) even if the fetus is
defective and does not even qualify as a potential person, it is still a member
of the human community and to terminate the existence of a member of the
community would diminish the kind of bond essential to the preservation
and health of the community.12
Notice that in each of the reasons just now offered for prohibiting the
abortion of the early term fetus the metaphysics of persons was supplemented with moral principles in order to yield the moral conclusion. I
suggest that this is not just a fact about metaphysical naturalism or the
particular reasons chosen, but a fact about the insufficiency of any metaphysics of persons all by itself to ground an ethic of life. I should hasten
to point out, also, that each of the reasons offered is eminently plausible
as a prima facie justification for prohibiting the destruction of a human,
non-person.
Consider now the claim that human persons are at least partially composed of immaterial souls, which are connected as intimately as you like
to human organisms. On all such dualist views currently on offer by
Christian philosophers, be that dualism of the Cartesian variety or of the
Thomistic variety advocated by Moreland and Rae, be it emergent dualism or creationist dualism, on all such views it is metaphysically possible
for the soul both to a) continue in existence after the demise of the organism it animates and b) carry with it the identity of the person. On such
views, therefore, abortion ends the life of an object that is such that if it
ceases to exist no person will cease to exist as a result. For this reason it is
not only plausible to think that abortion never ends the existence of a person, but it in fact is an entailment of Moreland's and Rae's own brand of
dualism. And if an abortion never ends the existence of a person, then,
for dualists, any prohibition against abortion cannot be because it
destroys a person. 13
On such a view as Moreland's and Rae's one can still oppose abortion,
of course. One might, for example, offer the following as support for a
prohibition against abortion: God intends every human person to be a
soul-body composite, and abortion is the wrenching apart of what God
intends to be joined. Notice, however, the metaphysics of dualism does
not alone support the moral conclusion that the life of a human fetus
ought to be protected. Instead, it is appeal to God's intentions that, coupled with the metaphysics, supports the prohibition. But such a consideration as this is no less congenial to naturalist views of persons, as I shall
soon suggest. I believe that our discussion so far is sufficient to demonstrate that neither a metaphysics of dualism nor a metaphysics of naturalism about persons alone settles the moral issues at stake by either entailing or precluding an ethic of life. I conclude, therefore, that although it is
true that naturalist views of persons lack the metaphysical resources
either necessary or sufficient to generate moral obligations or moral
expectations to prohibit the taking of human life, this is also true of dualist views of persons.

MATERIAL PERSONS, IMMATERIAL SOULS, ETHIC OF LIFE

223

III. Objections and Replies
Objection: It might be objected that naturalist views of persons are not
all on a par, and that even if some versions of naturalism do not have horrendous moral implications, it is not the case all do not. For example, consider animalism. According to animalists, although every human person
was once an early term human fetus, no early term human fetus is a
human person. Therefore, every human person once was, and may be
again, a human, non-person. Yet granting the moral principle that" a wrong
making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its
future"14, it follows that aborting human but non-personal fetuses would
be prima facie seriously morally wrong. It would be wrong because to
abort them would be to deprive them of valuable futures, namely, futures
just like ours.15
But now consider the Constitution View of human persons. It seems to
be handicapped in ways animalism is not. For according to defenders of
the Constitution View, human persons are not identical with human animals. 16 Therefore, it appears as though defenders of the CV cannot avail
themselves of a moral principle like" a wrong making feature of a killing is
the loss to the victim of the value of its future". They cannot avail themselves of a principle like this, it might be argued, since on the CV none of
us human persons is, was, or ever will be, numerically identical with a
human animal, including human fetuses. Since no human fetus is, was, or
ever will be, identical with a human person, killing a human fetus will not
deprive the fetus of a personal future. So it might be objected that the CV
in particular is without the resources to ground a plausible ethic of life. 17
Reply: Not surprisingly, I disagree that defenders of the CV are without the resources to ground a plausible ethic of life. First, we are not in the
ordinary business of life given to distinguishing the "is" of identity from
the "is" of constitution. Am I a human animal? Was I ever a human fetus?
Well, defenders of the CV say "yes" to both, in the sense that I am now
constituted by a human animal that once was a fetus." Defenders of the
CV, therefore, can employ some of the same kind of moral principles as
their animalist relatives in order to generate prohibitions against abortion.
For example, because a normal human fetus "is" a person in potentia, in the
sense that it will come to constitute a person if left to develop in the ordinary
way, the life of a human fetus ought to be protected. In the same way, even
if the fetus is defective and does not even qualify as a potential person, in
the sense that there is no likelihood that it will come to constitute a person,
it is still a member of the biologically human community and to terminate
the existence of a member of the that community would diminish the kind
of bond essential to the preservation and health of the morally human community. Moreover, I have argued elsewhere that every human fetus is created by God with the ultimate intention of coming to constitute a person
and on the basis of God's ultimately good intentions for it the life of the
fetus ought to be protected. 19 The same holds for human organisms in persistent vegetative states. It is plausible to believe that God intends every
human organism to constitute a person, and in view of this there is a prima
facie obligation not to kill a PVS patient. So even defenders of views like
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the CV are not without the moral and theological resources to argue for the
moral wrongness of abortion, some varieties of euthanasia, etc.
Objection: On the face of it, it looks as though a prohibition against
killing a fetus would be because doing so would prevent it from coming to
constitute a person, or in the case of human organisms in persistent vegetative states, coming again to constitute a person, thus pre-empting God's
intentions for the human organism. 20 However, based on a plausible principle of persistence for human bodies I have argued elsewhere for the possibility of human bodies persisting through death, or their being resurrected
some time after death. 21 But if God will see to it that fetal bodies and the
bodies of PVS patients will not go out of existence, but persist through
their deaths, or go out of existence only temporarily (only to be resurrected
by God at some time in the future), the prohibition cannot owe to preempting God's intentions. For if what I have argued elsewhere is correct,
those intentions will be fulfilled, if not before death, then after.
Reply: Whether God intervenes to resurrect our bodies or to see them
remain intact through death, neither of these gracious acts in any way
diminishes our obligation not to kill. First consider an analogy for resurrection. It would be wrong for my son to attempt to destroy the table I
made even though, let us suppose, it is true that I could and would restore
the table. It would be wrong for my son to take actions purposefully
intended to destroy the table because aside from a flagrant act of disrespect
it would, if successful, temporarily thwart the aims and intentions I had as
its creator. That is, it would cause the table to cease to exist; if not forever,
then at least for a time. So too with acts of killing human organisms.
Although God can and will raise human bodies from the dead, killing
them would be at cross purposes with God's aims.
Consider now the case of immediate survival. If our bodies can survive
death it is still plausible to believe that we have an obligation not to undertake actions which, save for the gracious intervention of God, would kill a
human organism, since our undertaking such actions would be at cross
purposes with God's intentions for natural, biological human life, i.e., they
would, save for the gracious intervention of God, destroy what is necessary for human personhood, the end for which God creates human, biologicallife. So even if one is a naturalist who believes as I do that though we
die yet shall we live, either in virtue of being resurrected or persisting
through death, there are still plausible reasons for why there is a prima facie
obligation not to kill.

IV. Moral Responsibility and Entia Successiva
There are two final issues that need to be addressed. First, it might be
argued that there are broadly moral considerations that do seem to favor
some form of a dualist metaphYSics of persons over naturalist views. For
example, suppose all complex material objects such as tables, ships and
physical organisms are entia successiva, in Chisholm's sense of being successions of related objects, but not strictly and philosophically speaking, entia
per se, i.e., genuine objects in their own right. And suppose further mereological essentialism is true such that all entia successiva are relatively short-

MATERIAL PERSONS, IMMATERIAL SOULS, ETHIC OF LIFE

225

lived entities owing to their composition out of aggregates of different parts
at different times. Since the bearers of moral responsibility for past actions
must persist for an appreciable length of time it seems no human person is
identical with an ens successivum. If there are human persons i.e., responsible
agents, they must be entia per se, as entia per se are the only sort of thing that,
strictly and philosophically speaking, endure through time. But the only
candidate for an ens per se with which to identify a person is an immaterial
and partless soul. So there must be immaterial souls if there are persons.22
There are two points to make in reply to this sort of moral consideration
in favor of dualism. First, even if the metaphysics is true it doesn't follow
that an immaterial soul is the only candidate for a human person.
Chisholm's own position at one time, it will be recalled, was that we
human persons are tiny physical objects, housed in human brains, objects
that neither gain nor lose parts during the course of their existence. 23 So if
Chisholm was right, then it is false that if there are persons they must be
immaterial and partless souls. More important, however, if mereological
essentialism is true and immaterial souls are the only candidates for enduring entities capable of possessing agency and responsibility, then although
naturalism might entail that there are no persons or agents at all the moral
question as to whether vulnerable human lives ought to be protected
remains an open question. The question is not settled by metaphysics
alone. After all, from the fact that no canines are persons it does not follow
that we have no obligations with respect to how we treat them.

v. On The Word 'Person'
This brings me to the final issue I want to consider.24 I have been using
the term 'person' in the sense of "individual with a capacity for certain
kinds of psychological states". There are, however, different senses of the
term 'person'. Suppose instead of using the term in the sense of "individual
with the capacity for certain kinds of psycholOgical states" we use the term
in the moral sense of "an entity deserving protection under an ethic of life,"
i.e., an entity possessing inherent value. Now if we embrace a thesis like
MB: Only human persons are moral beings (i.e., entities deserving
protection by virtue of possessing inherent value)
it might be thought that we can grant that while we may have obligations
toward non-persons our obligations toward moral persons differ in important respects from our obligations toward non-persons. For example,
obligations toward moral persons are correlated with moral rights and in
virtue of this we might think that our obligations toward persons are
weightier than those toward non-persons. If Moreland and Rae are committed to something like MB, then they are right to think that views like
animalism and CV, which deny human personhood to human fetuses and
PVS patients, cannot generate moral obligations that carry anything near
the same weight as those generated by views that do count human fetuses
and PVS patients as persons.
There are several ways to respond to this. First, I believe a virtue of

Faith and Philosophy

226

grounding value in something like God's ultimately good intentions for
God's creation is that one need tell only one story that obligates us to protect the life of created, living things whereas a view like Moreland's and
Rae's must tell two stories; one of them yielding obligations to persons and
another yielding obligations to non-persons. Second, a single story
grounding value in theistic intentions is compatible with there being different degrees of moral weightiness. Our obligations toward moral persons
might be weightier than our obligations toward non-persons based on
God's intentions for each kind. But it is plausible to believe that our obligations toward human non-persons are, for the same reason, weightier than
our obligations to non-human, non-persons. For example, because God
intends every human organism to constitute a human person, and human
persons have a privileged role in God's economy, our obligation to human
fetuses and PVS patients is weightier than our obligation to non-human
entities, so much so as to prima facie prohibit the killing of either the human
fetus or the PVS patient. I believe, therefore, that naturalist views of
human persons like animalism and CV can grant MB without there following any dire ethical consequences.

Conclusion
I have been arguing against the claim that one's metaphysicS of persons
alone is decisive for an ethic of life. I have contended that neither a metaphysics of dualism nor a metaphYSiCS of naturalism about persons alone
either entails or precludes an ethic of life. I have also argued that views
according to which some human organisms are not also persons are compatible with the belief that it is morally impermissible to kill human, nonpersons. Where it might appear that a particular metaphysics of persons
alone and all by itself entails a particular moral conclusion (be that conclusion for or against life) it is instead other claims supplemental to it and conjoined with it that lead to the conclusion. That in itself may not seem all
that interesting, since we know that an "ought" cannot be wrung from an
"is". What is more interesting is what I hope also to have established;
namely, that a robust ethic of life is no less congenial to a metaphysics of
naturalism about human persons than it is to a metaphysics of dualism
about human persons. In fact, I hope to have shown even more than that.
I hope to have shown that when it comes to dualism and ethics at the beginning and end of life, things are not nearly as straightforward as some dualists are inclined to think. 25

Calvin College
NOTES
1. See Lynne Baker's Persons and Bodies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000) and my "Persons, Bodies and the Constitution
Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999) 1-20.
2. See Eric Olson's The Human Animal (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
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Research 57 (1997) 95-110.
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are non-human persons (e.g., God and the angels) that are non-physical.
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Thus the argument I attribute to Moreland and Rae seems completely irrelevant to the morality of physician assisted suicide (and wife assisted suicide,
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example, on the very same page of Body and Soul they say contradicting things.
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and Soul, 121.
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13. If the dualist objects that a living human fetus is a person in virtue of
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ensoulment does not occur until around the third month of gestation.
Therefore, prior to the third month there is no human being in the womb, since
where there is no human soul there is no human being. Thus the non-human
"transitional beings" that exist in the womb prior to human ensoulment also
will not become human beings. Rather, they will be replaced by human beings
and will have been composed of the very same stuff that compose the human
beings that eventually take their place. So a similar objection applies even to
certain interpretations of Thomism! Of course, this is not an insurmountable
problem if the basic thesis of this paper is correct. For discussions of Thomist
embryology see Brian Leftow's "Souls Dipped in Dust" in Kevin Corcoran ed.
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